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Abstract 
 
The United States is often hailed as the world's largest 'free market'. But this 'free market' is 
also the world's largest penal colony. It holds over seven million adults – roughly five per cent 
of the labour force – in jail, in prison, on parole and on probation. Is this an anomaly, or does 
the 'free market' require massive state punishment? Why did the correctional population start 
to rise in the 1980s, together with the onset of neoliberalism? How is this increase related to 
the upward redistribution of income and the capitalization of power? Can soaring incarcera-
tion sustain the unprecedented power of dominant capital, or is there a reversal in the offing? 
The paper examines these questions by juxtaposing the ‘Rusche thesis’ with the notion of 
capitalism as a mode of power. The empirical analysis suggests that the Rusche thesis holds 
under the normal circumstances of ‘business as usual’, but breaks down during periods of 
systemic crisis. During the systemic crises of the 1930s and the 2000s, unemployment in-
creased sharply, but crime and the severity of punishment, instead of rising, dropped percep-
tibly. 
 
Introduction 
 
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the State of California to release 30,000 to 
40,000 of its 140,000 inmates (Supreme Court of the United States 2011; Liptak 2012). 
California’s prisons have become so overcrowded that the Supreme Court declared the 
situation unconstitutional. The decision was imminent. For nearly two decades, California, 
along with many other states, was busy getting ‘tough on crime’. In the early 1990s, the state 
enacted the ‘Three-Strikes Law’, which mandates life sentences for third-time serious crime 
offenders, and it pursued the country’s ‘war on drugs’ and other law-enforcement campaigns 
 its prisons were overflowing at nearly twice their capacity.  with increasing zeal. Soon enough,
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The United States is often portrayed as the archetypical liberal model. It is the world’s 
largest, most prosperous ‘free market’ and the greatest generator of profit on earth. And yet 
this liberal haven is also the largest penal system in the world. There are now more than two 
million inmates in its prisons and jails and another five million on probation and on parole. If 
you add these two numbers together, you get a ‘correctional population’ of over seven 
million. This correctional population is the largest in the world – both absolutely and relative 
to the overall population – and it is also the largest the country has ever seen. 
From a conventional viewpoint, this combination of market prosperity and intense 
punishment may seem puzzling. The common expectation is for crime and punishment to 
correlate with poverty, backwardness and deprivation; to be a feature of the Third World, not 
the First.  
Knowingly or not, this expectation is grounded in the customary separation of 
production from state and capital from power. According to the liberal version of this 
separation, accumulation breeds economic prosperity, and prosperity in the economic sphere 
in turn reduces crime and calls for less punishment in the socio-political sphere. The radical 
viewpoint, particularly the Marxist, transcends this simplistic economism. But the 
economics/politics bifurcation nonetheless remains, as Marxists still prioritize the cycle of 
industrial production and employment as key to understanding the ups and downs in 
imprisonment.  
This paper rests on a very different understanding of what constitutes capitalization, how 
it evolves historically, and the ways in which it relates to crime and punishment. Our starting 
point is to annul the standard separation between ‘economic’ production and accumulation 
on the one hand and ‘political’ institutions and the state on the other. If we discard the 
politics/economics duality and instead think of capital as power and of capitalism as a mode 
of power, the puzzle disappears. The greater the capitalization of power, the greater the 
resistance to that capitalization and the larger the force needed to prevent this resistance from 
exploding. As profits increase to make distribution more unequal, the result is mounting 
resistance from below, and this resistance in turn leads to retaliation from above. The rising 
crime and intensifying punishment that we now see in the United States are key 
manifestations of this dialectic of capitalized resistance and retaliation.  
 
The Questions 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of crime and punishment within the larger 
context of capitalized power, and specifically in relation to the limits of such power.  
This exploration continues the line of argument we have developed over the past several 
years in a series of conference presentations and papers. In 2009-2011, we introduced the 
concepts of systemic crisis and systemic fear (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b; Bichler and Nitzan 
2010; Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011).2 We claimed that the current crisis – which started 
not in 2008 but in 2000 – is systemic, and that capitalists are now concerned not so much 
about employment, production or even profit, but about the very survival of their system. 
Then, in 2011-12, we examined the ‘asymptotes of power’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2012).3 
Capitalists in ant capitalists in particular, we argued, have objective  general and domin
                                                        
2 The arguments explored in these articles were presented at the First Forum on Capital as Power: ‘Cri-
sis of Capital, Crisis of Theory’, held at York University on October 29-30, 2010. 
3 This work was first presented at the Second Forum on Capital as Power: ‘The Capitalist Mode of 
Power: Past, Present, Future’, held at York University on October 20-21, 2011. 
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reasons to fear for their system. We showed that, in the United Sates, the present distribution 
of income-read-power – ranging from the most aggregate indicators of the national accounts 
all the way to the differential earnings of dominant capital – is pushing against its class limits. 
And we suggested that, if the pushing continues, it could trigger systemic collapse. 
 
Figure 1 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital 
gains; it excludes government transfers. Grey areas indicate periods 
during which the 5-year moving average of the data series exceeded 
45%. The last data point is for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012).  
 
The goal of the present paper is to examine the darker side of this struggle. In the past, 
resistance to capital was associated mainly with production, workers, left political parties, 
strikes and mass demonstrations. But as the world changed, new forms of resistance and 
retaliation have emerged, and the ones we will look at here are crime and punishment. There 
is an impressive and thought-provoking Marxist literature that deals with the political 
economy of crime and punishment. But as we shall see, this literature, which goes all the way 
back to Friedrich Engels (1971, originally published in 1845), follows a research path and 
offers explanations that are quite different from the ones given here.4  
Let us start with two charts that relate the distribution of income and capital on the one 
ishment on the other. hand with the extent of state pun
                                                       
Figure 1 shows the income share of 
 
4 Recent contributions to this literature include Lynch (1988), Michalowski and Pearson (1990), 
Michalowski and Carlson (1999), Lynch (1999), Lynch and Michalowski (2006), Greenberg and West 
(2001) and Carlson, Bradshow and Buist (2013). For a critical review, see Lynch (2010). 
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the top 10 per cent of the U.S. population. This share offers a proxy, however imperfect, for 
the power of the ruling class and the thick power belt that supports it. The shaded areas in the 
figure denote two historical extremes – periods during which the income share of the top 10 
per cent of the population exceeded 45 per cent. During the 1930s, this share approached 47 
per cent of total income. And in retrospect, that level proved to be the asymptote of capitalist 
power. Pushing against it triggered a systemic crisis, followed by the complete creordering of 
the U.S. political economy and a sharp decline in capitalist power, proxied here by a large 
drop in income inequality. The situation now is remarkably similar, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. During the 2000s, the income share controlled by the top 10 per cent of the 
population approached 48 per cent, a level whose attainment and sustainment required the 
ruling class to subject the underlying population to increasing doses of violence, pain and 
sabotage.  
Figure 2 illustrates one key manifestation of this process – and the difficulty of sustaining 
it. The chart reproduces the distributional measure from Figure 1 and contrasts this measure 
with the adult ‘correctional population’, expressed as a share of the overall population. The 
correctional population comprises adults in prison, in jail, on probation and on parole.5 And 
as the chart shows, the ‘correctional’ share of the population is tightly and positively 
correlated with the distributional power of the ruling class: the greater the power, the larger 
the dose of violence inflicted on the underlying population. Presently, almost 2.5 per cent of 
the U.S. population is under some sort of institutional punishment – which, as indicated, is 
the largest proportion in the world and the highest in the country’s history. Although there 
are no hard and fast rules here, it is doubtful that this massive punishment can be increased 
much further without highly destabilizing consequences. The 2011 Supreme Court order to 
release 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners is perhaps a sign that the ruling class is apprehensive of 
such a destabilization; and the apparent peak in both income inequality and the correctional 
population suggests that capitalist power may be approaching its asymptotes and that a 
systemic reversal could be in the offing.  
Now, let us focus on the correctional population. In Figure 3, the black series at the 
bottom denotes the correctional population as a share of the overall population (which we 
take from Figure 2). The top red series shows the annual rate of change of the bottom series. 
Historically, this rate of change has fluctuated between −10 and +10 per cent, and the 
question we need to ask is what drives these changes: Why did the correctional population 
remain fairly stable till the late 1970s? Why did is soar during much of the neoliberal 1980s 
and 1990s? And why did it level off in the 2000s?  
 
                                                        
5 Raw data for the overall correctional population are available only from 1980 onward. For the period 
of 1925-1979, the raw data cover jail and prison inmates only. Note, however, that for the period of 
1980-2010, the overall correctional population and the number of jail and prison inmates are tightly 
correlated, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.993. For this paper, we assumed that the two series moved in 
tandem also during the period of 1925-1979 and used the latter series to extrapolate the former. Our 
empirical work here utilizes the resulting raw/extrapolated series for the overall correctional population. 
The conclusions, though, would have been the same had we used the jail and prison population instead. 
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Figure 2 
U.S. Income Distribution and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of the overall population, right)
(left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The income share of the top 10% of the population is 
from The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012). Data on the correctional population are 
from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: 
Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv)). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Correctional Population as  
a Share of the Overall Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(right)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the pe-
riod 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 
onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv)). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
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Georg Rusche 
 
Until the 1930s, these types of questions were never asked, let alone answered. The subject of 
crime and punishment was studied mostly by novelists, legal experts, doctors, psychologists, 
philosophers and moralists. It was rarely if ever dealt with by political economists, and it was 
certainly never studied scientifically. 
The first to undertake this type of study was the German political economist Georg 
Rusche (for a biographical sketch of Rusche, see Melossi 2003). Rusche was born in 1900 and 
received his PhD in economics in the mid-1920s. He was interested in labour economics, and 
he also became involved in prison work. This background led him to contemplate the 
connection between punishment and the labour market. In the early 1930s, he was 
commissioned by the Frankfurt School to write a book on the subject, and shortly thereafter 
he produced a concise article, titled ‘Labor Market and Penal Sanction’, where he spelled out 
his thesis (Rusche 1933). Six years later, he published, together with Otto Kircheimmer, the 
full manuscript, titled Punishment and Social Structure (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939).6 
According to Rusche, crime and punishment were too important to be left out of political 
economy. They needed to be anchored in economic theory, he said, and they had to be 
embedded in the evolution of class relations and class conflict. What were the basic 
propositions the researcher should start from? Rusche offered four. 
 
 The first proposition – which today may sound like a liberal triviality – concerned the 
goal of the penal system. Crime consists of acts forbidden by society, and one of the 
purposes of the penal system, Rusche posited, is to limit and reduce those acts.  
 
 The second proposition – which nowadays may ring like a mainstream cliché, but back in 
the 1930s sat well with the materialist emphasis of Marxist analysis – had to do with 
Bentham’s ‘calculus of pleasure and pain’. In order to deter crime, the penal system needs 
to convince people that ‘crime doesn’t pay’; in modern economic parlance, we would say 
that it needs to make the expected pain from punishment greater than the expected gains 
from crime. 
 
 The third proposition identified what we may call the ‘asymptotes of penality’. Most 
people disposed to crime come from the lower strata of society, where the conditions of 
life are the hardest. This fact means that in order to deter crime, the penal sanction must 
be worse than the living conditions of these lower strata. ‘If the prison doesn’t underbid 
the slum in human misery’, Rusche (1933: 4) quotes Bernard Shaw, ‘the slum will empty 
and the prison will fill’. In other words, the lowest living conditions in society set the 
upper limit of the penal system. 
 
 The fourth and final proposition concerned the rate of unemployment. Many factors 
affect the living conditions of the lower strata, says Rusche. But the most important by far 
is the labour market, and particularly the ‘excess supply/demand’ for labour, or the rate 
of unemployment. When there is ‘excess supply’, unemployment rises and wages decline, 
                                                        
6 Although the detailed analysis was published jointly by Rusche and Kirchheimer, this paper focuses 
on the key propositions first articulated by Rusche alone. 
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causing crime to increase and punishment to intensify. And when there is ‘excess 
demand’ and unemployment decreases, the opposite process is set in motion. 
 
These observations, which Rusche says hold in every society, set the general boundaries of 
penality: 
 
 When labour is abundant, deprivation is close to its limits, so the unemployed can be 
deterred from crime only by the ultimate punishment: death. Rusche gives the example of 
China, where a huge reserve army of unemployed makes human life worth close to noth-
ing. Under those conditions, he observes, it is common for captured criminals to be exe-
cuted without much fuss.  
 
 By contrast, when labour is scarce and there are not enough workers to fill all the jobs, 
the penal system shifts toward reform and exploitation. The goal now is not to prevent 
the hungry from criminal acts, but to convince unwilling labourers and criminals that 
they need to be working. This situation, says Rusche, existed for example during the 
European Enlightenment of the seventeenth century, when ‘excess demand’ for labour 
ushered in by the Mercantilist Era brought prison reforms. Moreover, since ‘excess de-
mand’ for workers drives wages up, it became profitable to lock up criminals and use 
them as forced labour, and that too was a feature of European Mercantilism. All in all, a 
tight labour market causes the system to move from execution to exploitation.  
 
Now these are the two logical extremes: death on the one hand, penal reform and forced 
labour on the other. A political economy of crime and punishment, says Rusche, needs to 
start from this analytical skeleton and then flesh out the real historical process that Disraeli 
referred to as the ‘two nations’ and Marx called the ‘class struggle’. The first person to offer 
such analysis was Rusche. 
Rusche’s own work was largely historical and comparative. He went through a series of 
epochs, examining in each case (1) the conditions of the labour market; (2) the nature of 
crime; and (3) the intensity of punishment. And what he found was largely consistent with his 
hypothesis. 
 
 During the early Middle Ages, land was abundant and the population sparse. Most crime 
was about passion rather than property, and punishment usually took the form of 
revenge, penance or monetary fines. 
 
 In the late Middle Ages, land grew scarcer and the population more abundant. There 
were peasant wars and social unrest, and armies of beggars became commonplace. 
Property crime and robbery were on the rise, but criminals were often unable to pay, so 
punishment grew crueller and execution more common. 
 
 During the Mercantilist period, roughly the seventeenth century, wars, hunger and 
plagues reduced the population, while trade raised the demand for workers. Labour 
became scarcer and wages increased. It was in this context that the Enlightenment 
movement made punishment more humane and that imprisonment emerged as a new 
venue to exploit forced labour. 
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 In the Industrial Revolution, roughly the eighteenth century, mechanization made 
workers abundant, wages fell and the reserve army of the unemployed swelled. Forced 
labour was no longer necessary, and prison conditions became punitive and grew 
harsher. 
 
 In America till the late nineteenth century, rapid industrial development, abundant land 
and a relatively small population made labour scarce and wages high. The crime scene 
accorded with Rusche’s hypothesis: criminal offences were low; prison reform was in full 
swing; conditional sentences, parole and probation were increasingly used; and scientists 
began to study the causes of crime and how welfare policies can abate them. 
 
 Rusche also provided an interesting comparison between the United States and Germany 
during the 1930s. In America, he said, massive unemployment and weak unions drove 
wages down, causing the penal system to become more overcrowded, brutal and 
repressive. In Germany, in contrast, the presence of strong labour unions mitigated the 
decline of wages and helped moderate penal sanctions.  
 
 Finally, Rusche was also prescient in predicting the use of concentration camps to solve 
the labour shortages created by the rearmament drives of totalitarian regimes.  
 
The Puzzle 
 
Rusche himself received little recognition in his lifetime and committed suicide in 1950. 
Although he offered a very impressive starting point for what was then a totally new 
approach, for a long time his work remained largely unknown and did not make it to the 
mainstream of either criminology or sociology, let alone political economy.  
It was only in the 1980s, with soaring U.S. crime and the massive increase in 
incarceration, that his approach finally gained some traction, particularly in the critical 
literature. Also, there were now more systematic data to study, and with computing 
becoming cheaper, critical sociologists and radical criminologists started to subject Rushe’s 
hypotheses to various empirical investigations.  
But then there arose a puzzle. Whereas Rusche’s long-term historical hypotheses seemed 
to shed light on various epochs and lead to derivative theses and theories, the conclusions 
from shorter-term analyses, particularly of contemporary Western societies, were more 
ambiguous.  
The breakdown happened around the 1980s. The central axis of Rusche’s argument is 
that penality should be positively correlated with ‘excess supply’ in the labour market. Most 
researchers take the rate of unemployment as the key proxy for ‘excess supply’ of labour and 
the share of the overall population under ‘correction’ as the proxy for penality.7 These two 
proxies are plotted in Figure 4 – unemployment on the left scale and the correctional 
population on the right. Now, the chart shows that until the early 1980s the two proxies were 
correlated positively (though by no means tightly). However, from the early 1980s onward, 
this correlation breaks down completely. With Ronald Reagan in office and neoliberalism in 
full swing, unemp d – yet the correctional population went vertical. On the loyment decline
                                                        
7 The ‘excess supply’ of labour and the level of penality could be estimated in many different ways. 
Given the broad nature of our claims, we deliberate focus on the simplest, most conventional measures. 
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face of it, then, it would seem that the Rusche thesis was loosely valid until the beginning of 
neoliberalism, but not afterwards.8  
 
Figure 4 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of the overall
population, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. Prior to 1980, systematic data are 
available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier years, 
the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, by 
computing the average ratio between the total correctional popula-
tion and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for 
unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 
6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv)). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). Unemploy-
ment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest 
Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Ba457); 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
ght (series code: RUC@US). 
from 1948, data are 
through Global Insi
                                                        
8 Inverarity and MCarthy (1988; 1989) offer empirical support for the Rusche thesis till the 1980s. For a 
recent review of the empirical literature and its shortcomings, see Pfaff (2008). For a theoretical critique, 
see Lynch (2010). 
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Incarceration and Exploitation 
 
This apparent breakdown meant that, from the early 1980s onwards, radical criminologists 
and critical sociologists were no longer able to establish a simple link between unemployment 
and incarceration. Their explanations, writes Michael Lynch (2010 :73), have ‘failed to 
explore the independent significance of the direct effect of economic structures on 
incarceration and punishment, and thus are inconsistent with the position taken by Rusche 
and Kirchheimer’. 
Lynch’s own solution is to make Rusche’s labour-market thesis a subset of the broader 
Marxist understanding of ‘productive relationships’ in capitalism. His starting point is the rate 
of exploitation in the so-called ‘productive sector’, specifically manufacturing. Competitive 
forces compel capitalists in this sector to use labour-saving technical change, he explains; the 
result is growing mechanization, which tends to raise the rate of exploitation, defined as the 
sectoral ratio of surplus value to variable capital; with the ratio between capitalist and labour 
incomes increasing over time, manufacturing employment tends to diminish and the working 
class suffers increasing marginalization, alienation and exploitation; and it is these later 
impacts that lead to rising crime, stiffer penal enforcement and higher incarceration. 
This broad Marxist view, Lynch argues, enfolds the narrow Rusche thesis. ‘The 
unemployment rate’, he writes, ‘taps into a portion of the marginalization process, but fails to 
represent its more expansive outcomes (alienation and exploitation; deskilling of the labor 
force; distinctions between types and duration of unemployment, etc.,) associated with 
Marx’s theory of surplus value’ (2010: 78, emphasis added). The broad exploitation 
perspective, he adds, also differs from the post-Fordist model (De Giorgi 2006, 2007), 
according to which the historical shift from ‘economies of scale’ to ‘economies of scope’ has 
served to loosen the links between unemployment, crime and penality.  
Lynch (2010) puts his model to a statistical test. Focusing on the United States during the 
period of 1977-2004, his multivariate empirical analysis shows changes in incarceration to be 
positively correlated with the rate of exploitation in manufacturing.9 He is unable, however, 
to support Rusche’s thesis – namely, that the level of incarceration during this period is 
positively correlated with unemployment.  
The main difficulty with this approach lies in the underlying categories (for a detailed 
critique of Marxist value theory, see Nitzan and Bichler 2009a). In order to measure the rate 
of exploitation in society, Marxists need, among other things, to identify the socially 
necessary abstract labour contents of commodities and to distinguish productive activity 
(which generates surplus value) from unproductive activity (which uses it). Unfortunately, 
labour values cannot be observed, and there is no objective way to separate productive from 
unproductive activity. The common solution is to take a shortcut. Most Marxist analysts use 
the neoclassical price and quantity estimates of the national account as proxies for Marxist 
labour values, and they further assume that all surplus value originates in several sectors of 
the national accounts that they classify as ‘productive’ (usually manufacturing, agriculture, 
construction, mining and utilities).  
This seems to us a theoretically problematic and historically outdated framework on 
which to bu olitical economy of contemporary capitalism. Does it make ild an encompassing p
                                                        
9 Lynch computes the amount of surplus value as the difference between manufacturing value added 
and the manufacturing wage bill. Assuming that prices are equal to values, this measure excludes the 
very large surplus value that, according to Marxist analysis, originates in manufacturing but ends up 
being consumed by the unproductive sectors. 
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sense to trace the origin of all capitalist income to a shrinking sector that currently accounts 
for a mere 10-20 per cent of all business activity, and that is likely to get even smaller? And if 
penality in society is indeed driven by the exclusion, alienation and marginalization of 
workers, shouldn’t this impact be mediated, at least in part, through the rate of 
unemployment? Crime and punishment in capitalism certainly need to be understood as part 
of the broader logic of accumulation. But in our view, this broader logic can no longer be 
easily analysed with the ‘material’ categories of nineteenth-century sweatshops, abstract 
labour, productive capital and the rate of exploitation.  
 
Re-search 
 
One way or the other, the empirical rejection of the Rusche thesis has been too hasty. It seems 
to us that, at any point in time, penality should be proxied not by the overall level of the 
correctional population, but by its rate of change. The reason is simple. The overall level of 
the correctional population is determined by two factors: (1) the cumulative results of past 
crime and punishment; and (2) current crime and punishment that cause this cumulative 
result to increase or decrease. The current rate of unemployment affects only the second of 
these factors; it influences not the past levels of crime and punishment, but their current rate 
of change.  
Figure 5 reflects this shift in emphasis, and the effect is dramatic. The figure shows the 
same rate of unemployment as in Figure 4. But penality now is proxied not by the level of the 
correctional population relative to the overall population, but by the annual rate of change of 
this ratio. There are two important things to note in this chart. 
 
1. We can see that, for much of the past century, annual changes in the U.S. correctional 
population were almost perfectly ‘explained’, at least statistically, by annual changes in 
the rate of unemployment.10 Rusche was right – indeed more right than he could have 
anticipated. According to the figure (and Occam’s razor), there is no need for 
complicated models, multiple variables and assorted excuses (when the models fail). The 
two forms of sabotage – unemployment and penality – mirror each other very closely.  
  
2. But there are two important exceptions to the rule – the first occurred during the Great 
Depression of 1930s, the second in the present crisis. During both of these systemic 
crises, which the chart shades in grey, the two series are not positively, but negatively 
correlated. In both, unemployment rises sharply – but penality, instead of soaring in 
tandem, decelerates sharply or actually falls. 
 
So we have an enigma. If our interpretation of Rusche is correct, then what explains the 
decoupling of unemployment and penality during systemic crises? Is this a mere coincidence, 
or do systemic crises alter the underlying relationship of the two processes? We return to this 
enigma at the end of the paper. 
 
                                                        
10 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.59 for 1937-2007 and 0.67 for 1945-2007. When the data are 
smoothed as 5-year moving averages, the 1945-2007 coefficient rises to 0.8. 
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Figure 5 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(annual rate of change, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the pe-
riod 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for un-
employment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 
onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv)). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). Unemploy-
ment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest 
Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Ba457); 
from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through 
Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
 
Decompose 
 
Let us try to make sense of the two observations made in the previous section. The first step is 
to decompose the rate of change of the correctional population. Consider Equation (1), where 
the dots on top of the variables indicate temporal rates of change. In this equation, the rate of 
change of the share of the correctional population in the overall population is approximately 
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equal to the rate of change of the correctional population less the rate of change of the overall 
population. 
 
1. 






populationoverallpopulationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationalcorrection
 
 
Now, if the rate of change of the overall population is fairly stable, variations in the share of 
the correctional population in the overall population (the left-hand side of the equation) will 
be dominated by the rate of change of the correctional population (first element on the right).  
So let’s decompose the rate of change of the correctional population. Mathematically, 
this rate of change comprises three components: (1) the intensity of punishment, proxied by 
the change in the correctional population relative to crime (with ∆ denoting the difference 
between two successive observations); (2) the crime rate, measured by the ratio of crime to 
the overall population; and (3) the correctional population as a share of the overall 
population. The decomposition is given by Equation (2): 
  
2. 
populationalcorrection
populationalcorrectionpopulationalcorrection   
 
    
populationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationoverall
crime
crime
populationalcorrection   
 
    
populationoveralltheofshareaaspopulationalcorrection
ratecrimepunishmentofintensity   
 
Crime and Punishment 
  
Let us look more closely at the numerator of the third line of Equation (2), beginning with the 
crime rate. Figure 6 shows the historical evolution of what the FBI calls the ‘serious crime 
rate’. Serious crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft (U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation). The FBI collects these statistics from various sources, standardizes them 
and expresses them as a ratio to the overall population. For example, in 2010, the serious 
crime rate was 334 for every 10,000 people, or 3.3 per cent. Note the long-term cyclicality of 
the serious crime rate. It rose from its nadir of 2 per cent in 1960 to a peak of 6 per cent in 
1980. At that point, criminologists, social commentators and politicians thought that all hell 
was breaking loose, that the crime rate was likely to shoot through the roof, and that the 
social fabric of the U.S. was about to disintegrate (see for example, Levitt 2004). None of 
these predictions has materialized. Instead of rising, the crime rate started a long-term 
decline, and by 2010 it was half as high as it was in 1980.  
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Figure 6 
U.S. Serious Crime and Murder Rates (per 10,000 persons) 
www.bnarchives.net
(right)
(left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of 
the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to 
the overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homi-
cide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft and motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: The number of murders is from Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) 
(series code: Ec191 for 1900-1932 and Ec22 for 1933-1959); and 
from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-
2010). Population data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) 
(series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the popula-
tion) is from UCR Online as above. 
 
 
Unfortunately, we do not have unified serious crime statistics for years prior to 1960. But 
we do have data for the murder rate, depicted here by the thin red line. The number of 
murders of course is much smaller than the overall number of serious crimes. In 1980, for 
instance, for every 10,000 people there were 600 serious crimes but only one murder. The key 
for our purposes, though, is that the two series are highly correlated. And if this correlation 
also held prior to 1960, it implies that the U.S. crime rate has followed a fairly stylized long-
term cycle.  
Bearing this cyclicality in mind, we can move to Figure 7. The thick black line in the 
figure measures the serious crime rate per 100 people. The chart also shows the intensity of 
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punishment, proxied by the thin red line. If you look at Equation (2), you can see that this 
intensity is measured in two steps. The first step is to compute net change in the correctional 
population. For example, in 2010 the correctional population fell by 157,000. This figure 
represents, for that year, the number of people who were caught, tried and sentenced, less the 
number of those released. For 2010 the net figure was negative – there were more people 
leaving the correctional system than entering it. The second step is to divide this net change 
by the number of serious crimes reported that year and multiply the result by 100. This 
computation gives us the net change in the correctional population per 100 crimes. In 2010, 
this ratio was −1.5, which means that for every 100 serious crimes, there were 1.5 people 
deleted from the correctional population. By contrast, in 1998 the number was +3.2, which 
means that for every 100 serious crimes, there were 3.2 people added to the correctional 
population. Note that this is a ‘composite measure’ that reflects four different processes: (1) 
the efforts and the effectiveness of the police; (2) changes in the legal code; (3) the harshness 
of the courts; and (4) the release rate of those previously sentenced.  
The chart shows that the two measures – crime and the intensity of punishment – are 
tightly correlated. Now, recall that, according to Rusche, crime and punishment are both 
driven by conditions in the labour market – particularly unemployment – so the correlation 
between them suggests we should examine their separate relationships to unemployment. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the serious crime rate and the unemployment 
rate since the 1960s. In general, the data seem consistent with Rusche’s hypothesis, at least 
until recently. They show the two processes to be moving in tandem, rising until the 1980s 
and receding afterwards. But by the late 2000s, the relationship between unemployment and 
crime seems to have broken down: while unemployment has risen sharply, the crime rate, 
instead of increasing, has continued to drop.  
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the intensity of punishment and unemployment. 
And the patterns here are similar to those in Figure 7. There is a positive relationship between 
unemployment and the intensity of punishment, with both rising till the 1980s and falling 
afterwards. And here, too, the relationship inverts in the late 2000s: while unemployment 
rises dramatically, the intensity of punishment drops sharply and indeed becomes negative 
(note in particular the late 1990s). Note that the short-term correlation since the 1980s is 
looser than before; but even in this looser correlation, the divergence between the series in the 
late 2000s stands out clearly. 
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Figure 7 
U.S. Serious Crime and the Intensity of Punishment 
www.bnarchives.net
(Annual Change in Correctional Population
per 100 serious crimes, right)
(per 100 persons, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the 
FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the 
overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, 
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and 
motor-vehicle theft. The correctional population consists of adults in 
prison, in jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, 
systematic data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For 
those earlier years, the total correctional population is estimated in 
two steps: first, by computing the average ratio between the total cor-
rectional population and the number of adults in prison and jail dur-
ing the period 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for 
each year the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ra-
tio. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the 
population) is from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm 
for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
The correctional population is from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 
onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv).  
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Figure 8 
U.S. Unemployment and Serious Crime 
www.bnarchives.net
(per 100 persons, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of 
the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to 
the overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homi-
cide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft and motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are 2010 for seri-
ous crime and 2012 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to 
the population) is from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-
2010). Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the Unit-
ed States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series 
code: Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Figure 9 
U.S. Unemployment and the Intensity of Punishment 
www.bnarchives.net
(Annual Change in Correctional Population
per 100 serious crimes, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the pe-
riod 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The serious 
crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the FBI Unified Crime 
Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the overall population. 
Part I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle 
theft. The last data points are 2010 for net change in correctional 
population and 2012 for unemployment.  
 
SOURCE: The correctional population is from Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 
onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv)). The num-
ber of serious crimes (Part I Index Crime) is from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm 
for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Taking Stock 
 
What do these relationships mean for capital as power and for the limits on that power? To 
contextualize our conclusions, let us reiterate our earlier findings. In our recent work, we 
noted that this is not a regular crisis but a systemic one, and that it is not a crisis of production 
or finance, or of a mismatch between them, but a crisis of power. The ruling class, we said, is 
struck by systemic fear – that is, fear for the survival of capitalism. The reverberations of 
crime and punishment – including the recent Supreme Court order to release a quarter of 
California’s prisoners – may be signs of that fear.  
We then outlined the objective ‘asymptotes of capitalist power’. The ruling class, we said, 
is fearful for a reason. The logic of capital as power is deterministic. It forces dominant 
capitalists to accumulate differentially and augment their power. They have no choice in this 
matter. They have to push toward the asymptotes of their power, relentlessly. And as they get 
closer to those asymptotes, their push elicits counter forces, making systemic collapse 
increasingly likely.  
In the present paper we have looked at the dark side of this process – the side of 
resistance. In the past, most analyses of resistance were anchored in the productive process. 
The focus was on industrial strikes, workers, mass movements and political parties. This 
‘materialist’ focus was subsequently challenged by the ethno-cultural revolution. Instead of 
the old myths of the Enlightenment and socialism, there arose a new emphasis on power and 
postist ideologies. Subjective deconstruction substituted for history’s ‘laws of motion’. 
Determinism was discredited, but so was meaning and significance. 
Our own work breaks with this postist fashion. Autonomous resistance – such as the 
May 1968 uprising in France or the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987/8 – does not abide by 
the logic of capital and therefore cannot be analysed from within that logic. But most 
resistance to capital as power is not autonomous, but heteronomous: it does not initiate – it 
responds; it is less an action and more a reaction; it is not external but integral to the conflictual 
logic of capital as power. In short, it is part and parcel of the capitalist mode of power, and 
that embeddedness makes it amenable to objective, deterministic inquiry.11 
In order to engage in such inquiry, though, we need to transcend the conventional frame 
of reference. Most critical researchers continue to separate the capitalist reality into 
‘production’ and ‘power’. In this framework, the labour market is part of the economy and 
accumulation, while the penal system is part of the state and the socio-political system more 
broadly. Rusche sought to challenge this view: he tried to analyse penality in relation to both 
production and discipline, and unemployment in relation to both criminality and the 
economy. But working within the Marxist frame of reference, he continued to think of 
capitalism as a mode of production. So his attempt, however ingenious, remained focused on 
material conditions and therefore was incomplete.  
From the viewpoint of capital as power, penality and unemployment are not distinct 
aspects of politics and economics, respectively. Instead, they are different forms of capitalized 
resistance and sabotage. Human creativity is a positive form of resistance to capitalist power, 
and the threat of unemployment is the means by which the ruling class tries to strategically 
sabotage and subjugate ity to capitalist ends. Similarly with crime and punishment. 
Illegality is a stance to capitalist power (a 'primitive rebellion', as Engels 
this creativ
negative form of resi
                                                        
11 The concepts of heteronomy and autonomy are developed in Castoriadis (1991). On the difference 
between the heteronomy of capital and the autonomy of resistance, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a). 
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1971 called it), and penality is the major institution that keeps this resistance from 
undermining the capitalist creorder.  
These forms of resistance and sabotage fit into the breadth and depth regimes of capital 
as power (Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Chs. 15-17). In the past, we argued that 
during a depth phase, the sabotage of stagflation (stagnation and inflation) assists the process 
of ‘accumulation through crisis’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2002). Now, since crime and 
punishment are tightly correlated with unemployment, we can see how this additional form 
of sabotage kicks in. During the depth phase of the 1970s and 1980s, unemployment and 
inflation increased, as did crime and punishment. Conversely, during the breadth phase of the 
1990s, they all decreased.  
And here we come to the enigma of Figure 5. During the systemic crises of the 1930s and 
2000s, the tight correlation between penality and unemployment seems to have broken down: 
in both periods, the sabotage of unemployment rose sharply; yet crime and punishment, 
instead of rising in tandem, actually receded.  
What could explain this enigma? One possibility is that some of the data we use are 
incorrect or inaccurate. A second possibility is that our top-down presentation of the data is 
too crude, and that a more refined set of proxies for unemployment, crime and punishment 
will eliminate the anomaly. But there is also a third, substantive, possibility, and that is that 
systemic crises alter the rules of the game. These crises not only dent the resolve of the ruling 
class; they also change the class disposition of criminals. Under the system of ‘business as 
usual’ (including its cyclical crises), the poor feel that there is ‘no way out’. Without jobs, 
without dignity and with little prospect for change, the only alternative is crime. But during a 
deep, systemic crisis, there emerges another, transformational, alternative. This alternative is 
based not on individual alienation and protestation, but on class solidarity; not on defying the 
system through Quinney’s ‘crimes of resistance’ (1980),  but on altering its very structure. 
Perhaps it is the emergence of this democratic opening during a systemic crisis that causes 
crime to drop despite soaring unemployment.12 
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